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In 2003, Posen argued that the United States military enjoyed “command of the commons,” an unchallengeable superiority on the high seas, at high altitudes, and in space. By contrast, the U.S. military could still be challenged in “contested zones” in littoral areas, at low altitudes, and on land. The implication was that the United States could exercise global influence by conducting military operations from standoff distances but would be unable to sustain a more ambitious policy of regular, on-the-ground interventions. Now, almost 20 years later, the rise of China and the spread of military technology have changed the military landscape. In this paper, I examine whether the United States still enjoys command of the commons. I argue that changes in the distribution of naval, air and space power have increased the size of contested zones vis-à-vis other great powers, though they are still confined to specific geographic areas. The shrinking commons makes it more difficult to enforce foreign policy preferences from afar, and even commons areas are more vulnerable, presenting the dilemma of whether to take risky escalatory actions in a conflict over contested areas. These changes increase the difficulty of maintaining global influence, but do not yet endanger that project. Against lesser powers, Posen’s analysis largely still holds.