How Legislators Perceive Redistributive Preferences of Voters

• In Event: Political Elites, Economic Inequality and Unequal Representation

Abstract

Recent work on unequal representation shows that the preferences of the rich are more represented than those of the poor. This paper contributes to this literature and provides evidence for a new mechanism for unequal representation. I argue that legislators underestimate citizens preferences for redistribution because their own redistributive preferences are lower than the general public. This difference is particularly prevalent among conservative politics. Survey data with politicians and citizens in five democracies - Belgium, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland - elicit redistributive preferences and politicans' estimates of public preferences. The estimations shows that
politicians underestimate redistributive preferences because of their own preference profile.

Authors

• Christian Breunig, University of Konstanz

• Luzia Helfer, Geneva University, Political Science and International Relations

• Julie Sevenans, University of Antwerp