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Judicial Decision-Making in Authoritarian Regimes: Evidence from Russia

Fri, October 1, 3:00 to 3:30pm PDT (3:00 to 3:30pm PDT), TBA

Abstract

My paper looks at judicial decision-making in authoritarian regimes and investigates whether some judges are more likely to rule in favor of the state than others. In this regard, I argue that judges who come from the public sector (e.g., the court bureaucracy, prosecutor's office, investigative services, or other government agencies) are more likely to issue favorable decisions because of their lack of employment options outside of the state. To test this theory, I use original data from the Russian commercial courts on the career paths of judges and a sample of more than 300,000 court cases from 2008-2019. For my causal identification strategy, I exploit the random assignment of cases to judges, which allows me to ensure that there are no significant differences in case characteristics that could potentially impact judges’ decisions. I find that judges with public sector backgrounds are indeed more likely to issue favorable rulings toward the state.

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