Easy Come, Easy Go: Strategic Switching in Plurality Elections

• In Event: Sincere and Strategic Voters

Abstract

Strategic voting occurs when voters choose their second preference rather than their most-preferred candidate, because this candidate yields a higher expected utility. While most studies of strategic voting are cross-sectional, in this paper we use the unique panel structure of the 2010 British Election Study (BES) to assess how CHANGES in voting intentions are related to CHANGES in expected utilities. This methodology provides preferable estimates of strategic behavior than standard cross-sectional analyses, allowing us to strike a healthy balance between internal and external validity. Furthermore, it allows us identify whether specific demographic groups or political profiles are more responsive to expected utility considerations. Among other things, we demonstrate that voters with higher levels of education are more responsive to strategic considerations than those with less education; and also that conservative (liberal) supporters are less (more) responsive to strategic considerations than supporters of the other two main parties. These results provide strong and nuanced support for the idea that, precisely among voters who have the requisite levels of political sophistication (education) or accumulated 'practice' (liberal supporters), expected utility calculations are an important element electoral choice.

Authors

• Daniel Max Kselman, IE University

• Emerson M. S. Niou, Duke University

• Austin Horng-En Wang, University of Nevada, Las Vegas