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The Effect of Informal En Bancs on Process and Precedent

Sat, October 2, 2:00 to 3:30pm PDT (2:00 to 3:30pm PDT), TBA

Abstract

In the U.S. Courts of Appeals, a circuit sitting en banc may reconsider a three-judge panel's decision to correct panel error, resolve intercircuit conflict, bring circuit precedents in line with Supreme Court decisions, or resolve issues of particular importance. Some circuits also employ informal en banc procedures. These procedures vary in their specifics, but they are uniformly less cumbersome than their formal en banc counterparts. In an informal en banc, panel judges survey the full complement of circuit judges for agreement on an issue and--with sufficient support--resolve that issue in the panel opinion, noting the circuit's acknowledgment and acceptance of the panel's action. Informal en bancs exist in a state of procedural and precedential limbo. The procedures governing them vary by circuit and are often opaque. Informal en banc review short-circuits the traditional process by which litigants challenge panel decisions, and the precedential value of portions of panel opinions "pre-approved" by the full circuit is unclear.

We consider the impact of informal en banc processes on the development of circuit law. We begin with a descriptive analysis that summarizes informal en banc usage between 1937 and 2009 and compares the use of formal and informal en bancs in circuits where both are available. This analysis uses structured and unstructured text data to identify the contexts in which judges use informal en banc review. We then ask whether the procedural differences between formal and informal en bancs generate substantive differences in law; we examine the subsequent treatment of formal and informal en banc cases using PageRank data from the Caselaw Access Project.

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