Search
Browse By Day
Browse By Time
Browse By Person
Browse By Mini-Conference
Browse By Division
Browse By Session or Event Type
Browse Sessions by Fields of Interest
Browse Papers by Fields of Interest
Search Tips
Virtual Exhibit Hall
Change Preferences / Time Zone
Sign In
X (Twitter)
Authoritarian rulers permit some space of mass contention to in part address informational and principal-agent problems. Literature has long recognized the importance of regime-afforded political opportunities for the emergence and success of social protests in repressive contexts. However, it seldom considers how opportunity clues regarding the intention and capacity of relevant regime actors could be perceived as credible by potential protesters. We describe one such condition that may help deliver this credibility in China. Higher-level political elites’ connections with locals, through selective attention and just enough collateral damage, could credibly commit them to prioritize local social stability and pressure local stakeholders on behalf of the aggrieved, thereby producing more, larger-scale, and sooner-responded collective resistances. Using a compiled data set on cadres’ biographical information and protest events, we test the propositions.