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The year 2019 marked the peak of a growing trend of social mobilization over the last decade, taking place in developing and developed countries alike (Brannen et al. 2020). In Santiago, Chile, protests by high school students over the rise of the subway fare suddenly escalated into violence and a nationwide social upheaval unseen since the return of democracy in 1990. These events took most observers and the general population by surprise. Throughout the upheaval, the social movement was leaderless, with few visible organizations and leaders. One year after the start of the upheaval, 78% voted for a new Constitution in a national referendum.
Since the 2019 Chilean social movement had no official narrative, no organizations, no leaders, and no explicit demands it is relevant to ask: who were the supporters of the upheaval? What brought them together to protest? Did supporters and non-supporters have radically different views on the society they want? Where does the Chilean upheaval stand with respect to the theories of protest?
This presentation addresses these questions quantitatively, based on a survey module we designed building upon the rich literature on protests (e.g. Gurr 1970; Dix 1984, Goldstone 1994; Dalton et al. 2010; Ortiz et al. 2013; Tilly and Tarrow 2015; Kenneth 2016). The survey was fielded in December 2019, when the social upheaval was still unfolding, allowing us to analyze protest behavior in a specific context while it is happening.
Following Beissinger (2013) our analyses distinguish between strong and weak supporters to evaluate factors associated with the decision to protest and its intensity, as well as opponents and those who are apathetic toward the upheaval. We first describe the demographics of these groups. Then we analyze what they see and what they want regarding the economic system, inequality, democracy, and the use of violence for social control and for achieving social change.
Our findings show that strong supporters are mainly young and educated people who do not come from the worst-off (Castillo et al. 2015; In Jo 2016, Blais 2006; Roberts 2016). The movement is left-wing and anti-incumbent (a negative coalition, as in Beissinger 2013). Supporters are relatively interested in and participate in politics (contrary to Castillo et al 2015). Despite inequality was considered the main reason behind demonstrations, supporters do not hold radically different views about desired levels of equality or redistribution. Differences lie more in their perceptions of meritocracy, and in the supporters’ greater distrust of the relation between inequality and politics (Justino and Martorano 2019; Castillo et al. 2015; Jetten et al 2020).
Protesters also show the highest support for democracy, they value freedom more and are less authoritarian than opponents to the upheaval. But they are also the less satisfied and distrustful on how democracy works in Chile. They are “critical citizens” (Norris 1999). They also hold radically different perceptions of law enforcement. Supporters of the upheaval are more likely to believe that the police and military abused human rights during the crisis and blame them for subway fires and looting. Regarding the legitimacy of the use of violence, supporters are more likely to consider the use of violence by the police illegitimate, while they justify the use of violence as a means of protest (Tyler 2006; Maguire et al. 2018; Gerber et al. 2018).
Finally, we discuss the conditions leading ordinary people to take massively to the streets to achieve social change, which may be relevant for understanding social movements and their outcomes elsewhere.