New Anti-Corruption Protests in Eastern Europe and Why Politicians Ignore Them

• In Event: How the State Deals with Opposition

Abstract

Why do incumbents ignore peaceful mass protests? The literature on protests and social movements, which examines how office-holders respond to mass public discontent, has focused predominantly on whether they choose to repress, or make concessions. Yet, incumbents have a third option – they could decide to ignore or neglect the protests and simply wait for the protest cycle to run its course. The most recent scholarship on government responses to mass protests in Asia and the MENA region present two conflicting answers to the question above. On one hand, by choosing to ignore the protests, incumbents use attrition in a strategic manner – they place the burden on protesters to continue to sustain high levels of mobilization for long periods of time. Participants in such neglected protests are likely to gradually loose motivation and simply go home. On the other hand, ignoring could also produce the opposite effect – it could make protesters more determined to stay on the streets. This is especially likely to occur, if the government adopts a condescending, dismissive, or right down insulting tone. The present paper evaluates these conflicting explanations with new evidence from Southeastern Europe. It examines two recent cases when Bulgarian governments ignored mass anti-corruption protests for months (first in 2013-2014, and most recently since July 2020 to present). The analysis reveals that both types of dynamic are at work in opposite directions. The competition between protesters and incumbents can, thus, be described as a game of chicken. Ultimately, it is a matter of which side blinks first. The paper also finds that the extra-institutional pressure is only one factor shaping the decisions of office-holders. The other important factor is the willingness of the protesters to engage extant institutional channels and participate in the political process. A key variable is electoral threat, especially the electoral strategies (or lack thereof) of the protest movement, their (un)willingness to cooperate with opposition parties, and the behavior of opposition parties themselves. Incumbents have much higher incentive to ignore peaceful mass protests when the protesters eschew electoral strategies and reject political parties. Experts and observers of the anti-corruption protests in Bulgaria have welcomed them as signs of active civil society and increasing pluralism. The public’s demand to end corruption is especially important, as Bulgaria repeatedly ranks among the most corrupt EU member states. However, the populist overtones and the outright rejection of political parties, as well as the lack of organizational capacity of the protest movements, gives incentives for incumbents to ignore them. The conclusion discusses how the insight could apply to other cases, including recent protests in Poland and the Yellow Vest movement.

Author

• Nina Simeonova Barzachka, College of the Holy Cross