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Indirect Favor Exchanges and Pro-Government Slant

Fri, October 1, 3:00 to 3:30pm PDT (3:00 to 3:30pm PDT), TBA

Abstract

The previous studies of media capture strategies either focused on coercive measures (e.g., censorship) or direct favor exchanges, which occur when the media outlet slants the content towards the government in return for state-advertising. However, scant attention has been paid to a more critical and more widespread type of favor exchange, which I call indirect favor exchanges. They take place when the government reciprocates the favorable media coverage by granting state contracts to the owner’s non-media businesses. These exchanges are indirect because the media owner indirectly benefits from the collusive relationship through her non-media holdings. They are financially more attractive and more important for media capture since advertising markets are tiny. At the same time, states are significant buyers of goods and services and regularly grant many high-stake contracts. As media outlets are increasingly owned by conglomerates, who operate in various sectors, analyzing the effect of such indirect favor exchanges are extremely important.

This paper analyzes around 315,000 Turkish newspaper articles published between 2007-2009 to present evidence on indirect favor exchanges. To do so, I construct two slant measures. The first one is widely used in the literature and built from partisan phrases, which are identified by analyzing a vast corpus of deputy speech data from the Turkish parliament. However, although widely used, this approach misses the dynamic nature of the slant since it uses a fixed set of words. More importantly, it completely ignores the contextual information since the words are taken out of their context. Therefore, I use machine learning and construct another context-aware slant measure from a state-of-the-art neural network model.

Using these slant measures, I show that newspapers owned by contractors are significantly more pro-government due to the state-contracts. Moreover, I leverage a legal change in the procurement law that grants the government more discretion in the construction sector to show that contractor-owned newspapers became even more pro-government and started using more pro-government partisan phrases after the change.

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