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How does government oversight of the military affect the occurrence of wartime sexual violence? This paper highlights the role of civil-military relations and state capacity in the occurrence of sexual violence and human rights violations more generally. Building on research that examines wartime sexual violence in the principal-agent framework, we propose a new game-theoretic model in which the military strategically deploys wartime sexual violence based on its expectation of oversight and punishment by the government. We describe an equilibrium where monitoring is an informative signal of the government’s capacity to carry out punishment. The government monitors strategically and may choose to remain “strategically ignorant” of the military’s conduct. Since government oversight is an informative signal of state capacity, the military abstains from wartime sexual violence when oversight is high. The model further suggests that the threat of international punishment can induce governments to monitor at a higher level. We examine the empirical implications of the model using data on sexual violence, military oversight and state capacity and find support for the hypotheses generated by the model.