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This paper provides evidence that exposure to illicit markets leads to an increase in the corrupt behavior of politicians. Using shocks to the price of gold, I show that when more rents from the illegal mining business become available in Peru, politicians are more likely to be indicted on charges of corruption. Furthermore, I show that these results are entirely driven by a moral hazard effect, and I find no evidence of adverse selection: politicians become more criminal after they are elected to office, past shocks do not seem to affect the probability that they commit a crime while in office, and political candidates are similar on their education levels and past criminal behavior at the time of the election. Results show that politicians in districts with more illegal mining, who are likely to become more corrupt, also perform worse than politicians in other districts, yet face similar reelection chances.