From Mao to the Islamic State: The Insurgent Civil-Military Balance

• In Event: Social Organization in Regular and Irregular Armed Forces

Abstract

Much discussion of conventional militaries focuses on the need for civil-military relations that put the civilians in control while insulating the military from politics. Yet, in the context of civil wars, such as those that have wracked Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, or Vietnam, successful insurgents often have highly integrated civil and military command structures. Despite the centrality of balancing political and combat objectives, there is little research into the form and implications of the civil-military balance within rebel organizations. To fill this gap, this manuscript presents early results from analyzing a novel database measuring a range of insurgent civil-military characteristics. Such factors include, among other things: questions about the types of institutions to promote dialogue between military and civilian leaders, the ethnic composition of political and non-political leaders, the ideological requirements for entry into military and political positions, the extent of civilian oversight, and the procedures for promotion within both wings. We illustrate how this approach can shed new light on a variety of pressing questions such as why some insurgents are more successful and united than others, the conditions under which insurgents decide to target civilians, and when negotiated settlements might be more likely.

Authors

• Alec Worsnop, University of Maryland

• Michael Cowan, University of Maryland, College Park