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Electronic Voting in Autocracies

Sun, October 3, 10:00 to 11:30am PDT (10:00 to 11:30am PDT), TBA

Abstract

Computer technologies have the potential to reduce voting costs and facilitate participation in elections. At the same time, in an authoritarian setting electronic voting is more vulnerable to fraud, loss of anonymity, and voter coercion, and is therefore more acceptable to voters favoring the vote option preferred by the autocrat. An increase in the costs of in-person voting should thus have an asymmetric effect on the behavior of pro-government and pro-opposition voters, with the former being more likely to migrate to electronic voting, and the latter more likely not to vote.

We develop a theoretical model formalizing this prediction. The prediction is tested with the data from the 2020 Russian referendum on Constitutional amendments allowing Vladimir Putin to remain in power until 2036. The in-person voting costs are proxied with COVID exposure that is measured using geolocated building-level data on COVID hospitalizations during the first two months of the pandemic. In total, we have data from 2764 precincts in Moscow. In accordance with the predictions, COVID exposure increased electronic voting registration in more pro-government electoral precincts, and decreased electronic voting in pro-opposition precincts. Our findings show that autocrats can use alternative voting technologies for their benefit, by selectively increasing turnout among supporters.

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