Conceptualizing the Temporality of Interests

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Abstract

This research intends to explore the usually overlooked dimensions of the widely-used concept “interest,” whether it is interest of states, individuals, or non-state actors. The realm of International Relations, particularly its mainstream rational choice camp takes interest as fixed. It is understandable given that their line of reasoning is dependent on cost-benefit calculations and that for this reason, the interest should be constant. However, no actors have only one interest; they have several interests, which are organized in the order of preferences according to the context and situations actors face. For example, there are short- and long-term interests, as well as specific and universal interest. This begs the question: in what mechanism these various interests are prioritized against each other?

This research sheds lights on the one of the most commonly used concept but from different angle. The concept of interest has been the cornerstone of International Relations scholarships, ever since Morgenthau (1948). It was also the center of the debate between constructivists and rationalists (Fearon and Wendt 2002). Although rationalists, especially in the study of cooperation among states now mostly draw on the cost-benefit calculations instead of the broader term “interest”, but the core has not changed: it is interest which drives rational actors, and explains their behaviors (Oye 1985; Fearon 1995). According to them, cooperation is possible only when it is in their interests by setting up sanctions, or when other obstacles of achieving optimal payoff such as uncertainty is alleviated by institutions (Keohane 1984), reputations (Tomz 2007), and the like. Constructivists also discuss the possibility of cooperation. In their view, for instance, cooperation can emerge when collective identity emerges and interests embrace other actor’s interest (Wendt 1999; not constructivist but see also Mercer 2005).

However, caveat is in order. The problem of both rationalism and constructivism is that they cannot sufficiently capture temporality. As extensively discussed below, the difficulty for rationalists in examining and incorporating the concept of long-term interest is its uncertainty. Since positivist epistemology prefer observable, predictable, and certain factors, rationalist scholars mostly rely on short-term interests, thus overlook or degrade the influence of long-term interests in the cost-benefit calculations. For constructivists, the notion of temporality itself is hard to be incorporated in their theory, both because of the lack of agency and of philosophical assumption of the constitutive effect.

The failure of conceptualizing long-term interest is crucial theoretically as well as normatively. Theoretically, the long-term interest is the blind spot for two main pillar of IR theories (rationalism and constructivism), and we need the endeavor to intentionally overcome the restrictions of epistemologies and ontologies of these two. Normatively, as I argue below, IR theories have failed to capture how the positive and virtuous change had been achieved and promoted by individual decisions. This is because long-term interest has a vital connection with our normative ideas, beliefs, and values.

Therefore, the most important question that this study shall address; how can we overcome the limitations of existing theories to fully conceptualize the long-term interest? The specific obstacles to tackle is twofold. First, the we need to find a way to conceptualize or identify the way in which actors’ interest are formed despite the uncertainty in the future. While rationalist approach has been unsuccessful in this challenge, constructivist’s notion of construction of interest has already offered us the conceptual tools to overcome this obstacle. However, the complete acceptance of constructivist’s argument cannot address the next hurdle: how to incorporate the temporality? This is because constructivists’ holist ontology is the basis of both constitutive theorizing and the lack of agency, which, I argue the cause of the lack of temporality in constructivism. Against this background, the following conceptualization draws on constructivism as basic approach, with crucial reservation on its assumption on agency-structure relationship. Put differently, I accept the idealist conceptualization of interest, yet at the same time deny the claim that ideational structure constitutes actors’ interest. Instead, I argue that individual long-term interest is based on our beliefs, ideas and values, and individuals can choose what beliefs or values to which their long-term interest based on.

Author

• Hiroki Osada, Graduate Institute Geneva