Practice by Design? Understanding the Patterns of NGO Participation Within IGOs

• In Event: Foreign Aid and NGOs in Developing Countries

Abstract

What explains the participation of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) within intergovernmental organizations (IGOs)? NGOs have gained more and more formal access to IGOs over time, and the existing scholarly literature has begun to systematically investigate the determinants of NGO access across IGOs. But we know surprisingly little about how NGOs operate inside international organizations once they are granted access. Indeed, NGOs do not operate within organizations uniformly; their participation varies in both the presence and depth of their involvement. This study seeks to understand the patterns behind this variation, a phenomenon I label NGO “practice.”

I argue that NGOs should indirectly aid the preferences of the United States by providing additional information on their adversaries and effectively collaborating with their allies. The United States does not explicitly command NGOs to engage in these endeavors. Rather, underlying incentives and transnational network structures encourage NGOs to practice more frequently and more deeply with the allies of the United States. However, this behavior may have a half-life. Over time, IGO bureaucrats can learn to work more efficiently with NGOs and subsequently generate more uniform participation. My explanation thus stresses the role of both power and process in determining the patterns of NGO behavior.

Using both quantitative and historical evidence, I draw initial support for this theory from the World Bank’s experience with NGOs. Original data on NGO participation are collected from archival documents that concern project loans and their implementation. The quantitative evidence is coupled with qualitative process-tracing that tracks the evolution of World Bank policy toward NGOs, with a special emphasis on bureaucratic learning. The results highlight the structural, yet dynamic determinants of NGO practice within the World Bank.

This study adds to our overall understanding of NGOs in global governance by stressing the variation in nonstate behavior that occurs beyond institutional design. My explanation draws attention to the systemic advantages granted to the United States and bureaucrats’ subsequent attempts to overcome said biases. I also provide an original data source to be used for future inquiries into this topic, or expanded to incorporate more data on a variety of international organizations.

Author

• Andrew McWard, University of Wisconsin-Madison