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The weaponization of economic and information interdependence is at the center of vivid scholarly and policy debates. US centrality in these networks is considered a powerful advantage, providing it with the unmatched ability to surveil activity (through panopticons) and deny access (through chokepoints). Yet, network power is theorized – and deployed – with little appreciation for its broader strategic implications. I argue that, precisely because states act in complex networks, consequences from panopticon and chokepoint usage are frequently non-linear. This leads to profound second-order effects: Costs are potentially imposed not just on foes but also partners, producing a backlash that undermines long-term strategic imperatives. Focusing on international data flows and semiconductor supply chains, I demonstrate how the US’ leveraging of panopticons and chokepoints is now surfacing as an impediment to its primary strategic goal: crafting a coalition of like-minded democracies against its declared ‘strategic competitor,’ China. While states have practiced military and economic power for centuries, network power is still poorly understood. My findings stress the importance of anticipating second-order effects, coordinating with partners, and embedding network power in a comprehensive and long-term strategic framework.