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Recent developments across political science have lead to an explosion of debate on common techniques of empirical inquiry across social scientific methodological traditions. In this paper, I argue for re-centering social scientific research on a common Bayesian philosophical foundation, oriented around the empirical comparison of pairs of primary alternative explanations. First, I argue for the value of isolating social inquiry into simplified dyads of contested explanatory truths, and avoiding research designs attempting to parse too many alternatives. Second, building on Zaks (2017) I offer a typology of alternative explanation heuristics to offer a unifying methodological framework to orient research designs by their distinctive methodological, ontological, and epistemic objectives. I conclude by illustrating the potential advantages for cumulative knowledge in adopting this simplified dual-alternative mindset in research design.