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For the last several decades, discussions of civil wars, insurgencies, and rebellions have not been able to escape referencing ideology, even if it has been simply to dismiss its relevance. Throughout the apparent waves of ideologically flavoured conflict, from Marxists, nationalists, and more recently, Jihadists, the relevance of ideology is far less disputed; however, how exactly it influences armed group behaviour still isn’t clear. My intent is to help provide that clarity by asking the question: What is the fortune of radical armed groups? More precisely, does an investment in ideological institutions, and the declared political goals of an armed group tell us who might win civil wars?
In this paper, I offer a clear conceptualisation of radicalism which i) helps clarify the often-blurry lines between when ideology does and doesn’t matter and ii) offers us the ability to meaningfully measure ideology. I suggest that radicalism possesses three main components: a desire for drastic political change, ideologically consistent behaviour, and the adoption of non-routine means to achieve those desires. I categorise these components to understand radicalism in a general sense, and more specifically for non-state armed groups. I demonstrate that by grouping non-state actors based on how ideological they are, rather than which ideology they subscribe to, we can better explain why the groups win and lose civil wars.
I argue that for radical armed groups, their fortunes are limited to attaining all or none of their goals. They either win or they lose. Neither do radical groups necessarily have an advantage in civil war. While their ideology could impart an advantage in battle, such as increasing military effectiveness, radicalism does not help them win the war. This is partly due to their radical ideology, which handicaps their ability to negotiate and compromise with their enemies. Compared to their less or non-radical counterparts, radical groups are least likely to negotiate with their enemies and just as likely, if not more, to lose. I suggest that there are several mechanisms which prohibit radical armed groups from settling during war, which include intrinsic belief, internal audience costs, overconfidence, and pluralistic ignorance.
To test this theory, I have created a dataset of N=80 non-state armed groups with variables that measure ideological institutionalisation (such as recruit indoctrination, ideological training, civilian indoctrination, and the presence of a propaganda cadre) and ideological ambition (desired political change and desired political control). In doing so, I have created an index of non-state armed group radicalism. Equally I classify the conflict outcome of these groups into four categories: hard victory (attains all goals), soft victory (attains few goals), soft defeat (attains no goals), hard defeat (the group is terminated).
Preliminary analysis supports the theory, revealing that radical armed groups are significantly more likely to experience extreme conflict outcomes (hard victory or defeat) rather than a moderate outcome (soft victory or defeat). Overall, this study clarifies with empirical evidence both the advantages and severe disadvantages of radical armed groups in civil war.