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What are the effects of a major health crisis on electoral support? Are incumbents more likely to benefit from rallying induced by anxiety and uncertainty or are they likely to be blamed for the health threat locally? And finally, is there a differential effect of rallying and penalty at different levels of government - and if so why? Employing an original two cross-sectional nationally representative surveys from Ukraine – collected by the authors in April and October 2020 - this paper finds that while there is evidence that individual level uncertainty, anxiety, and fear around the pandemic resulted in an albeit fragile rally effect shoring up support for the national government and specifically the president (one that persists even as the crisis deepens), there is even stronger evidence of a persistent incumbent covid penalty at the local level. Our analysis shows that when concerns about covid and covid-related policies were most pronounced, survey respondents report a willingness to punish mayors electorally. This finding maps on to precinct level results and local covid case counts (where available). The paper develops a theory as to why local politicians – who repeatedly flouted central government policy on lockdowns and restriction - were left more exposed in the pandemic context. We do so by placing the penalty effect in the context of the ongoing decentralization process taking place in Ukraine – but at a moment when state power is still predominantly centralized. To test these findings, we rerun our analyses with original data from Argentina (2020/2021), collected by two of the authors) in order to gain leverage on the role state centralization plays and to further examine whether the covid rally-penalty dynamic is inverted and favours subnational government in a more clearly federal context.