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Authoritarian leaders are forging formal intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) of their own, namely authoritarian intergovernmental organizations (AIGOs). As AIGOs’ decision making procedures and legal rhetoric heavily rely on their codified constitutions, it is crucial to understand when and why authoritarian members of AIGOs allow constitutional reformation. This paper explores two questions: (1) To what extent do authoritarian leaders delegate and pool their authority to AIGOs when it comes to constitutional reformation? (2) Why do authoritarian states legalize AIGOs even forgoing their sovereignty? By using IGO-level panel data 1980 to 2010, this paper empirically shows ambivalent behaviors of members of AIGOs. Authoritarian leaders are willing to tie their hands to collective decision made by like-minded members of AIGOs, showing motives of legalization stemming from cooperation problem. Yet, they are reluctant to grant authority that allows constitutional reformation to AIGOs’ third parties like secretariats, who are not autocrats themselves. AIGO members are cohesive yet exclusionary when dealing with constitutions. This paper contributes to the current understanding of burgeoning authoritarian international organizations as well as their legalization.