More Candidates and Fewer Voters: How an Abundance of Choice Demobilizes Voters

• In Event: Elections and Voting Behavior Virtual Poster Session
  In Virtual Poster Session: Elections and Voting Behavior: Voter Turnout and Choices Virtual Poster Session

Abstract

Electoral institutions should maximize the set of choices presented to voters while minimizing costs placed on them. By increasing the number of choices or candidates, however, electoral institutions necessarily increase the cost placed on voters. I hypothesize that the number of candidates in an election imposes an informational burden similar to choice overload on voters. When the decision-making process is too complicated, voters will opt out. Since the number of candidates in an election and voter abstention are likely endogenous, I cannot simply estimate the effect of the number of candidates on voter abstention. Thus, I use a difference-in-differences approach leveraging Louisiana’s abandonment and readoption of its unique electoral institution as a treatment and the unchanging electoral institutions in Mississippi as a control. I expect and find that the Louisiana Primary causes a decrease in voter turnout and an increase in ballot roll-off. My findings provide support for my theory that increasing electoral choice can have unintended, undesirable effects.

Author

• Spencer Hamilton Goidel, Texas A&M