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Conventional wisdom holds that today’s remaining non-democratic monarchs legitimate their rule in part by claiming to be a neutral arbiter who sits above the political fray and guarantees stability (Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2010). Like in all varieties of non-democracy, such legitimation claims stand alongside co-optation and repression to form the three primary “pillars” of authoritarian stability (Gerschewski 2013). As a relatively new concept in the study of authoritarian durability, legitimation helpfully directs scholars’ attention toward the non-coercive, non-redistributive practices non-democracies deploy in order to deter dissent and endure. Yet several questions remain regarding how legitimation interacts with, and is potentially undermined by, co-optation and repression; whether legitimation’s logic differs in monarchies versus other types of non-democracy; and how legitimation claims might lose their resonance over time and impact public dissent.
To address these questions, this paper uses extensive interview and documentary evidence collected over 15 months of ethnographic fieldwork in Morocco, a non-democratic monarchy that has witnessed a sharp rise in dissent in recent years. Indeed, unprecedented criticism of King Mohammed VI has become widespread in the years since the Arab Spring and unfulfilled promises of democratic change, even as the regime has increased its use of repression and accelerated its long-running practice of co-opting and sidelining oppositional figures.
This paper argues that increasing repression and co-optation have undermined the Moroccan monarchy’s legitimation strategy, which has led to an unprecedented rise in dissent. Specifically, I argue that the co-optation and sidelining of oppositional actors, alongside rising repression, has had the unintended consequence of highlighting the direct role of the king in the country’s politics—and its problems, undermining the monarchy’s core legitimation claim to being above the fray. Rising repression and, especially, co-optation have resulted in increased criticism of the monarchy and undermined its legitimation claim for at least two reasons. First, in promising political reforms, and associating the institution of the monarchy with those reforms, the king dramatically raised ordinary Moroccans’ expectations and made himself vulnerable to blame when reforms failed to materialize. Second, by overpromising while also co-opting or otherwise sidelining oppositional actors, the monarchy was left increasingly alone on the political stage, without credible co-optation targets who could shoulder blame in the future.
This paper contributes to the literature in two primary ways. First, it illustrates that legitimating claims might work at cross purposes with other stabilizing strategies regimes may pursue. Particularly in non-democratic monarchies which rely in part on the notion of a leader who is above the political fray, co-optation and repression can undermine the resonance of legitimating claims, with negative consequences for public dissent. Second, this paper illustrates that co-optation can have declining returns over time. As autocrats co-opt and sideline would-be rivals, if they are too successful, they may be left without others to co-opt in the future when needed, leaving them vulnerable to blame and public dissent—an argument that, importantly, is applicable to all varieties of non-democracy that depend on co-optation to endure. In sum, this paper helps theorize the logic of legitimation in autocracies and its relationship with other authoritarian stabilization strategies, filling a key gap in the literature while offering a roadmap for applying its conclusions to other contexts.