Post-Civil War Interim Governments: Bargaining by Other Means?

• In Event: Post-Conflict Institutional Structures

Abstract

Some peace agreements used to end civil wars include an interim government to handle the transition of power to permanent governments; some do not. These interim temporary, caretaker governments have great power in the fragile immediate-post war period. Minimally, they conduct the first post-war elections; maximally, they write new constitutions, oversee demobilization of armed forces, and conduct the transfer of power to permanent institutions. So far, the connection between conflict conditions and institution-building processes is under-explored. However, the inclusion of interim governments is an observable implication of an agreement to continue a negotiation process past signing an agreement. Here, I explore under what information and commitment conditions we see interim governments included in a peace agreement. Applying the bargaining model of war, I theorize that provisions for interim governments are included in peace agreements signed in conflicts that end violence with lower levels of information and commitment than conflicts without interim governments included. I test these implications using a multistate hazard model that dynamically models the conflict and settlement process as one process with interconnected transitions between war, negotiation, and different peace terms. I also use probit models with a selection function to further test the relationship between reaching a peace agreement and the terms included dictating government structures. This work extends how scholars consider the reach of a peace process' information and commitment dynamics and illustrate how these factors shape post-war institution building.

Author

• Marcella Morris, Emory University