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A key insight of research on economic sanction ineffectiveness is that third-party states often engage in sanctions busting by continuing to trade with targeted states. An important unanswered question is, how can sanctions busting be prevented from causing sanction failure? Based on a game-theoretical model, I argue that sanctioning countries, or senders, can discourage sanctions busting if they constrain the most influential member of the target's network. Using social network analysis, I identify the most central member of the target's network and see if it has important ties with the sender. Senders can use the threat of withdrawing cooperation over these ties to deter the member from engaging in sanctions busting. Since the target can also observe this interaction, it would be more likely to concede to sanction demands. I test this prediction with over 700 cases of economic sanctions from 1950-2004 using the Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions (TIES) dataset, and find support for my argument. This study has important implications for predicting sanction effectiveness and preventing sanctions busting.