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Electoral Turnover and Local Factional Rivalry in Senegal

Thu, September 30, 8:00 to 9:30am PDT (8:00 to 9:30am PDT), TBA

Abstract

In recent years, scholars have devoted considerable attention to Senegal’s democratic transition—most notably, from the Socialist Party to the Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS) with Abdoulaye Wade’s election in 2000. This paper examines how electoral turnover and party realignments at the national level have influenced local factional dynamics in Senegal.
Factionalism, a form of conflict that opposes subgroups belonging to the same political party, is an enduring feature of Senegalese politics since Independence (Barker 1973; Blundo 1998; Legros 2004; Schmitz 2000; Touré 2013). Factionalism allowed for a certain degree of competition within the single-party system. Political scientist William Foltz (1969) regarded Senegalese factions as a “transitional” form of competition that would eventually disappear. However, institutional innovations that were supposed to improve good governance, like the introduction of multiparty elections and decentralization, have not eradicated factionalism. Instead, the creation of elected rural councils in charge of managing public funds and allocating land resulted in the “localization of political struggles” (Blundo 1998, 4-5).
This presentation advances the literature on factionalism in two different, but interrelated, ways. First, it weighs in on the debate about the “function” of political factions. On the one hand, many authors suggest that factions primarily serve instrumental ends. Typically, leaders of a particular faction, who compete in a given political arena for access to office and control of attendant resources, recruit followers, who receive material assistance or other forms of help in exchange for their political support (Cottingham 1970). In this view, factions are unstable, as self-interested followers tend to leave patrons who are unable to provide sufficient protection and benefits. On the other hand, Bernhard Venema (1996) and Tarik Dahou (2002) criticize the conceptualization of factions as strategic groups that primarily pursue material and political interests. According to these authors, factions cannot be reduced to clientelistic networks that opportunistically form and dissolve depending on changing circumstances. For Dahou in particular, factions are cemented by the politics of affection and allegiance, such as lineage alliances, friendships, and feelings of loyalty and obligation.
Based on an in-depth empirical investigation of local politics in Fanaye, a rural community of the Senegal River Valley, this presentation contributes to this debate by arguing that political considerations represent a driving force of factional rivalry in Senegal. I do so by illustrating how democratic developments at the national level unexpectedly exacerbated factionalism in rural areas, which is the second main contribution of this talk. I document the origins and transformations of two competing factions in Fanaye (called Factions A and B), whose respective power was partially determined by rearrangements in political alliances under Abdoulaye Wade’s presidency.
Factionalism has been fuelled by what Senegalese metaphorically call political “transhumance,” that is the propensity of leaders to change affiliation and join the party in power regardless of its programmatic agenda so they can access patronage resources. These dynamics were visible in Fanaye, where fissures within the PDS emerged in 2002 due to a local leader leaving the Socialist Party for the PDS, creating Faction B, and securing the position of secretary-general at the district level, to the dismay of long-term PDS militants and members of Faction A. These tensions were momentarily contained until the 2009 local elections, but at this point factional competition erupted into the open.
At the time he was prime minister, Macky Sall cultivated close links with the newcomer to the PDS and Faction B leader in Fanaye, thus amplifying the conflict between the two factions. Macky Sall supported the newcomer for two main reasons: 1) to sideline rural politicians aligned with former Prime Minister Idrissa Seck, who had just created his own political party; 2) to co-opt former socialist patrons and construct a local electoral base following the 40-year reign of the Socialist Party. In Fanaye, PDS veterans, who felt they had to continually fight against the newly formed Faction B to obtain recognition from the higher levels of their party, thus sought to regain power at the local level in vehement ways.
This presentation draws from a plurality of research methods and theoretical approaches, ranging from political ethnography, to the anthropology of development, and to sociology. My findings are based on extensive field research conducted in Senegal over two years between 2013 and 2018, during which I interviewed more than 100 stakeholders. Operating from the premise that factionalism is not inherently good or bad, this paper aims to provide a nuanced understanding of local politics in Senegal.

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