Congressional Capacity and the Revolving Door

• In Event: Lobbyists and Lobbying, Strategies and Goals

Abstract

For several years, congressional scholars have noted a decline in congressional capacity (e.g., LaPira, Drutman, and Kosar 2020). Concurrent with that scholarship, Volden and Wiseman developed a Legislative Effectiveness Score that allows scholars to assess differences in effectiveness across legislators. Overall capacity and individual effectiveness are related concepts, and I hypothesize that they each affect the lobbying environment in DC. This paper presents correlations between congressional capacity and the robustness of the revolving door. As Congress loses capacity, becoming less prominent in policymaking than the executive branch, revolvers should increasingly emanate from the executive branch rather than the legislative branch. Relatedly, from a body of retiring legislators, those who move to K Street should have higher legislative effectiveness scores than who do not reemerge as lobbyists. Similarly, revolvers from the legislative branch with higher legislative effectiveness scores should earn more than revolvers with lower legislative effectiveness scores.

Author

• Scott H. Ainsworth, University of Georgia