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Listening to Donald Trump speak is disconcerting unless you are not really listening. By listening I mean something very specific, I mean a social practice of taking someone’s word as worthy of being voiced and thinking critically and holistically about the underlying message, or messages, they are trying to convey, as well as their intentions and methods of conveyance (rhetoric). Nobody listens to Donald Trump, and he knows it—or, perhaps, he at least acts as if he does. The New York Times publishes articles every couple of days that highlight Trump’s uncanny ability to relish in being an emperor without clothes, at the same time he brushes such pieces aside as “fake news” and tweets to his fanbase about some thing or another. At one point, Trump literally told a Fox News reporter that he invented the word ‘fake’, and—yet—his converts never seem to waver in their support.
In my view, this emerges as baffling for the positivist oriented Political Scientist attempting to codify and explain exactly what we, as academics, are supposed to do with a phenomenon like Donald Trump for two reasons. The first is methodological. Rather than presenting an explicit definition of populism, I highlight the difficulty that many mainstream epistemological approaches in Political Science face in terms of studying an object that is as contentious populism in contemporary politics. In doing so, I draw a stark contrast between positivist social science and what Bent Flyvbjerg (2001) has labelled Phronetic Social Science produced through his notion of “narrative interpretation” or “narratology”. I find the latter method to be more effective primarily because it calls for a polyphony of voices, places narrative and listening at the center of its method and prioritizes diachronic and context-dependent knowledge claims. The second reason is a failure of listening, a failure occurring simultaneously between academics and populists, between populists and their political opponents, and between populist supporters and detractors. I attempt to frame such a failure in relation to an extension of Alasdair MacIntyre’s argument regarding the fractionalization of moral discourse in After Virtue. More than anything, I think representational politics has essentially submersed moral disagreement into the very subjectivities of the people debating them; it has, in a sense, created an increasingly interminable disagreement between identities, a disagreement that proxies for moral discourse. As such, populism is a performative praxis that maintains important aesthetic realities.