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While the internet and social media provide today’s forum for public political expression, open access is perceived as a challenge to authority by some illiberal regimes or backsliding democracies. As a result, these governments often choose tools of digital suppression. In these environments of controlled communications, Hirschman’s theory of exit, voice, and loyalty predicts that displeased citizens must choose between voicing protest, or exiting the system. In reality, there a decided lack of meaningful dissent or protests where expected, even in states where exit is unfeasible. Through examination of the case studies of China, Hungary, Russia, and Iran, we find two patterns. At times, repressive governments opt for raising dissent costs through tight digital controls. At other times, they relax controls, giving a false sense of voice and citizens’ influence. By employing the latter strategy, central authorities exert control through generating a “release valve” for opposition. As a further benefit of digital suppression, states monitoring online political voices can surveil potential dissenters and uncover rising escalation of frustrations.