Search
Browse By Day
Browse By Time
Browse By Person
Browse By Mini-Conference
Browse By Division
Browse By Session or Event Type
Browse Sessions by Fields of Interest
Browse Papers by Fields of Interest
Search Tips
Virtual Exhibit Hall
Change Preferences / Time Zone
Sign In
X (Twitter)
Legislative scholars have long studied the impact of rules on the progression of legislation through specific stages of the policymaking process. However, much of this has focused on narrow set of rules that are not examined in conjunction with one another. This has led to a lack of understanding about the role and interaction of these rules on the ultimate outcomes of bills and overall chamber productivity. We develop a theoretical framework to understand the effects of rules governing individual member and party control at each stage of the legislative process and how collectively these rules affect the overall policy making process in legislative chambers. To test our hypotheses, we use an original dataset of legislative rules governing each stage of the policy process and bill data from 99 U.S. State Legislative chambers from 2010 to 2020. We find increases in progression and passage probability in chambers that have increasingly restrictive individual member access to legislation. We also find that more stringent agenda control procedures advantage the majority party in propelling their legislation through the chamber. Our findings have implications for the study of the policymaking process, institutional design, and roles of members and party organization in legislative bodies.