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This paper contributes to the theme of APSA this year by exploring a troubling, non-normative tradition of constitutional pluralism in the US: the persistence of “spaces of exception” within a constitutional order that has traditionally been understood to be monistically liberal. In the monistically liberal understanding, the United States is characterized by a strong commitment to the rule of law and liberal principles of constitutionalism. A large literature focusing on racial, indigenous, gender and other exclusions has challenged this monism by highlighting a more disturbing form of constitutional pluralism, in which liberal constitutional commitments have existed alongside illiberal orders of group hierarchy, subordination, and exclusion on the basis of ascriptive identity. In addition to these spaces of exclusion, a second “exception” to constitutional monism has been emergency powers that suspend or abrogate ordinary constitutional commitments. This paper explores the intersection of these two kinds of “exceptions” to liberal constitutionalism by tracing what I call the abolitionist state of exception, as both a heuristic device and intellectual context that we can use to make sense of Frederick Douglass’ mature political and constitutional thought following his break with Garrisonian abolitionism.
Scholars have tended to interpret Douglass’ shift from seeing the constitution as a pro-slavery document to an anti-slavery one in major ways: Douglass’s mature constitutional thought has been seen as a purely pragmatic, instrumental adaptation on the basis of political expediency, or alternatively, it has been seen as a realization of Douglass’ bedrock liberal principles of natural law.
The the “state of exception” of wartime slave emancipation under the laws of nations, as it was articulated in modern natural rights theorists such as Grotius, Vattell and Puffendorf, and taken up in debates surrounding slavery among the founding generation of the republic. I show textual evidence of Douglass’ familiarity with aspects of this tradition through his consistent references to piracy
In the second section, I argue that his tradition of exceptional wartime emancipation can help us make sense of Frederick Douglass’ shift toward political abolitionism in the late 1840s and early 1850s.
Two broader theoretical implications emerge from this study. First, it contributes to our understanding of the juridical and conceptual mechanisms of partition and containment by which liberal constitutionalism accommodates persistent spaces of exception. In this more troubling, non-normative form of constitutional pluralism, liberalism and illiberalism are accommodated to one another. Secondly, it shows that while “spaces of exception” such as slavery mark the boundaries of brutal zones of exclusion, exceptional powers such as martial law can also be envisioned and employed not just as a means of repression but also as a means of emancipation. Military emancipation under the law of nations and martial law were two such measures that provided the framework for the abolitionist state of exception embraced by Douglass and other political abolitionists.