Political Elites and the Appeal of Fake News in Brazil

• In Event: Misinformation and Conspiracy Theories

Abstract

While fake news is a growing concern among the public and political elites, important studies suggest that their persuasion effects are minimal. This skepticism is largely based on the evidence that pieces of media—and fake news in particular—typically have small and short-term effects on political beliefs. Furthermore, fake news consumption is tightly associated with partisan motivated reasoning which undermines the notion that new (fake) information could significantly change voters’ minds. Yet fake news, as a business and a political issue, is booming. If persuasive effects are minimal, why is fake news pervasive and salient? Who benefits from promoting disinformation? What sort of gains do political elites incur when endorsing, producing, or spreading false information? What strategic role does fake news play for political elites? The study we propose seeks to investigate the incentives of political elites to spread fake news stories. We will investigate these questions in the context of Brazilian politics. In a study conducted in 2018 in Brazil, we found that fact checking does not increase rejection of false stories during the election, even among a large share of self-identified nonpartisan voters. We also confirm that misinformation is strongly driven by partisan motivated reasoning, and that people believe in fake news that confirms their political predispositions. This finding suggests that fake news does not significantly change voters’ minds. If persuasion effects are minimal, why is fake news a booming business in politics? What sort of gains do political elites incur in when endorsing, producing, or spreading false information?
What strategic role does fake news play for political elites? Most recent work on the dissemination of fake news focuses on regular social media users in the United States. We still lack a good understanding of the role political elites play in this phenomenon and the strategic purposes behind the dissemination of disinformation. By identifying the incentives elites have to promote fake news, our study has the potential to inform interventions designed to curb these incentives and to dissuade political elites from spreading disinformation. From a practical standpoint, focusing on politicians’—rather than on citizens’—incentives to share fake news is important because there is evidence that elites respond to said interventions. We argue that disseminating fake news benefits politicians because these types of stories are effective at mobilizing supporters (H1) and distracting voters from potentially negative real news stories (H2).
Assuming that political elites’ actions are election-oriented, their behavior should be a strategic response to voters’ reactions to fake news. Therefore, to better understand the strategic use of disinformation by political elites, we designed two experiments that allow us to investigate in a more rigorous way how voters react to fake news shared or endorsed by these elites. The first experimental study (N=1,000, online) tests hypothesis 1 and consists of presenting participants with actual headlines of both real news and fake news that circulated on WhatsApp. We include headlines that are in favor of and against the two main political groups in the country (Workers’ Party and Bolsonaro’s government). The headlines contain a picture and will be presented in the format of a news piece shared on WhatsApp. After being presented with fake or real news stories, respondents answer questions about their likelihood to protest, to sign petitions, to share news online, to discuss politics, and to try to convince friends and family of their political views, among others. To test hypothesis 2, we will conduct a second experiment (N = 5,000, online) in which participants are presented with randomly assigned headlines of fake news and negative real news against the two political groups mentioned above. Participants assigned to the first experimental condition receive multiple clickable headlines to real negative news (and placebo nonpolitical headlines), while those in the second condition receive a combination of clickable headlines to both fake news and real negative news. We will track participants’ browsing activity and time spent reading the news articles, and include outcome questions that measure attention to real news and fake news, trust in different types of news sources, and opinions about the political groups targeted by the news pieces. We expect that those exposed to the environment with fake news will display lower levels of attention to real news, lower levels of trust in traditional news sources, and more negative opinions about the political groups targeted by the news stories. We expect political sophistication, news literacy and partisan attitudes to moderate treatment effects.

Authors

• Nara Pavão, UFPE

• Felipe Nunes, UFMG

• Frederico Batista Pereira, University of North Carolina at Charlotte