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Hobbes and Cavendish on Equality

Sat, October 2, 12:00 to 1:30pm PDT (12:00 to 1:30pm PDT), TBA

Abstract

The most famous chapter of Hobbes’ Leviathan opens with the idea of natural equality: “Nature has made men so equal in the faculties of body and mind as that, though there may be found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body or quicker in mind than another, yet … the weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest” (Curley, 74). For Hobbes, we are one another’s equals because we are equally vulnerable to being killed by one another. This understanding of equality has received little attention from contemporary scholars, despite growing interest in the idea of natural or ‘basic’ equality (Waldron 2017; Steinhoff 2015). Perhaps this is unsurprising given that Hobbes did not see equality as a good thing. The state of nature is a state of war because this kind of equality exists there. The fact that humans are naturally equal is used by Hobbes to justify inequalities in power: we need a Leviathan powerful enough to keep dangerous equals in awe.

Hobbes’ theory of natural equality, however, may not seem entirely plausible. It may appear that some are in fact more vulnerable than others, which would lead to predictable patterns of domination and subjection in the state of nature. In fact, Hobbes frequently admits that with respect to the four human faculties—strength, experience, passion, and reason—people are naturally unequal. This inconsistency has led some to conclude that Hobbes is not truly committed to the idea of natural equality (Hoekstra, 2012; Brookes, 2020). These analyses, however, have largely sidestepped Hobbes’ discussion of women. Yet, Hobbes’ portrayal of women in the state of nature, and particularly the Amazons, represent his most explicit discussion of this problem: he is at pains to explain why differences between the sexes, including differences in strength, do not lead to any patterns of domination in the state of nature. This contemporary scholarship has also neglected other writers who took up Hobbes’ idea of equality. Margaret Cavendish’s play Bell in Campo explores this idea of equality in the context of a civil war between men and women. The Amazonian general echoes Hobbes, claiming: “by our actions of war we have proved our selves to be every way equal with men; for what we want of strength, we have supplied by industry” (Act III, Scene 8). Turning to Cavendish’s work can therefore shed light on how this theory of equality can be reconciled with the fact that humans seem to have very different capacities.

This paper argues that cooperation is key to understanding Hobbes’ and Cavendish’s theories of equality. While some people, like women, may be individually weaker, they can always form a “confederacy with others in the same danger” (Curley, 74). Hoekstra has argued that this idea of confederacy belies the insincerity of Hobbes’ commitment to equality: “if … group formation is necessary to explain equality, as he suggests in Leviathan, that implies that the individuals are not equal” (89). I argue, however, that this reading neglects the fact that Hobbes treats cooperation as an individual capacity, not unlike strength. While some have physical or mental capacities, others have social ones. And it is not a coincidence that the weak are more likely to have this capacity than the strong, since the capacity to cooperate is often a response to domination.

Cavendish’s play, I argue, explores this dynamic; showing how the weak are able to cooperate in response to domination by the strong. Although the women in her play initially were too proud to cooperate with each other, the unrelenting domination of their husbands eventually inspires them to submit to the rule of a general who leads them to a glorious conquest over their enemies. In developing this narrative, Cavendish does not simply explore Hobbes’ theory of equality, but points out how it undermines aspects of his own contract theory. While Hobbes argued that the state of nature will induce all to consent to a Leviathan out of fear, Cavendish’s play explores the possibility that the dominated will form commonwealths out of passions other than fear. For Cavendish, cooperation is not just borne out of fear, but also out of the desire for freedom and, more specifically, fame.

Much of contemporary literature on basic equality argues that equality should be understood as an assertion of shared rationality, and that Descartes’ division of the rational mind from the body paves the way not only for equality, but for modern feminism. Turning to Cavendish, however, can help us appreciate the value of a theory of equality that is based on our bodies, rather than our minds. While Hobbesian equality is used to justify absolutism, the idea that we have equal capacity not just to kill, but to rebel and conquer as the Amazons did, could potentially be appropriated for feminist projects. A conception of equality that is based on the dangers that equals pose, rather than our shared rationality, may be the most rhetorically appropriate conception of equality for emancipatory purposes.

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