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European rules against the abuse of a dominant position are now more intensively enforced than anti-monopoly rules in the United States, in contrast to the historical pattern. In this article, I evaluate the reasons why, using a combination of historical analysis of legal developments and empirical analysis of the pattern of enforcement and judicial review. Economic patriotism, business capture, and the relative power of economists cannot account for the divide. American and European antitrust policy is structured by distinct competition paradigms which have been institutionalized by courts through case law. In the United States, a laissez-faire jurisprudential regime makes it difficult for regulators to win anti-monopoly cases in courts. In Europe, an ordoliberal jurisprudential regime has facilitated a more intensive enforcement program. In highlighting the divergent judicial construction of competition law within two multi-level, liberalized market economies, the analysis shows how jurisprudence shapes the policy paradigms used by regulators.