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Intelligence-Sharing with the IAEA: Balancing Capabilities and Legitimacy

Sun, October 3, 6:00 to 7:30am PDT (6:00 to 7:30am PDT), TBA

Abstract

The International Atomic Energy Agency, charged with implementing safeguards on the nuclear programs of member states, possesses limited intelligence-gathering capabilities of its own to detect illicit activities at undeclared sites. Several of its member states, however possess considerable intelligence capabilities, and can share intelligence with the IAEA about third party member states. This paper explores the careful three-way balancing act that this process entails. The intelligence provider wants to share just enough information to be credible while revealing as little as possible about sources and methods. The international organization itself must balance leveraging that intelligence with maintaining its credibility as an independent actor. The third party state that is the target of the intelligence sharing has an incentive to comply to avoid a costly confrontation with the IAEA or potential escalation, while its government tries to reduce the domestic and international reputation costs of compliance.

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