Stealing the Fight -- Restraint and Victory in Partner Warfare

• In Event: Advances in Conflict Processes

Abstract

How can the US and other powers address security threats emanating from ungoverned spaces in fragile states, to include preventing terrorist attacks such as those conducted on 11 September 2001? What lessons can we derive from decades of US military intervention around the globe about how to work with host nation partner security forces to counter insurgencies? Most fundamentally, how can powerful states design military interventions into foreign internal conflicts in a way that accomplishes their security objectives while working through partner military forces with often divergent preferences?

Counterinsurgency (COIN) scholarship and US doctrine built off it argues there is a positive relationship between the number of external troops and resources committed to an intervention and government victory. However, dubious outcomes from large interventions in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan have led some to question the relationship between external commitment and victory. On the other hand, some small footprint interventions have been successful to include in Colombia and the Philippines (2000s), both which never exceeded 1300 military advisors, and the US intervention in El Salvador (1980s) which had a congressionally mandated limit of 55 US advisors.

Building on principal agent literature pertaining to military assistance, I develop a theory of how the structure of the external actor’s military intervention (both the size of commitment and activities external forces engage in) influences the behavior of the host nation partner force. I hypothesize that large footprint interventions where US forces are heavily involved in combat, such as during the surges in Afghanistan and Iraq, will result in the external actor crowding out the partner forces from taking the lead in security operations, which I call stealing the fight. Alternatively, when external advisors deploy in smaller numbers throughout the conflict zone and focus on enabling the partner force rather than directly participating in combat, the partner force becomes more effective militarily, more willing to fight, and more willing to reform behaviors such as human rights practices in line with the external actor’s preferences.

An implication of these hypotheses is that the structure of an intervention will not only impact short term partner warfare dynamics, but also set the conditions for long term institutional capacity building of the host nation military. In large footprint interventions the US steals the fight in a way that might result in more effective short term tactical success against insurgents, but will also prevent the partner force from reforming or professionalizing. This may explain why the US surge in Iraq reduced short term insurgent violence, but when the US withdrew the Iraqi Security Forces were unable to fill the security vacuum and ISIS grew as a threat.

Small footprint interventions on the other hand ensure that while the US may enable the partner to be more effective today, the partner still has to take the lead in security operations since the US physically does not have the manpower to do more than advise, assist, and enable. The long term implication is that while security gains may be slower, they are also more sustainable - when the US withdraws it will leave behind a better trained force without creating a major security vacuum.

As an active duty Army Officer I have conducted large footprint COIN as an Infantryman for 20 months in Afghanistan and small footprint COIN and counterterrorism military advising in Africa as a Special Forces Officer for over a year. The hypothesized mechanisms that constitute this theory of partner warfare are motivated by my experiences training with and fighting alongside foreign militaries around the world. This background, and my role as the co-host of the Irregular Warfare Podcast (a joint production of the West Point Modern War Institute and the Empirical Studies of Conflict Project) provides me extensive personal experience engaging in these conflicts and a robust network of interview subjects for data collection.

This project will include over 50 research interviews conducted with military practitioners and national security policy makers across six case studies of US intervention: El Salvador (1979-1992), Colombia (2001-2015), counter-Boko Haram (2009-2020), Afghanistan surge (2008-2013), Iraq surge (2006-2010), and the counter-ISIS intervention in Iraq (2014-2020). These interviews reveal how underlying mechanisms at the point of interaction between external and host nation forces are consistent both across geographies and time. The implication is that different forms of intervention have consistently distinct influence on partner force behavior, providing insights for military practitioners and national security planners considering how to structure future military interventions in foreign internal conflicts.

Author

• Kyle Atwell