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Contracting Firms and Subnational State Capture in Colombia

Fri, October 1, 2:00 to 3:30pm PDT (2:00 to 3:30pm PDT), TBA

Abstract

It is now well known that pockets of "subnational authoritarianism" dot the landscapes of many large federal democracies, often sustained by hegemonic local parties that take advantage of federal structures to avoid oversight. However, subnational hegemonies can also emerge in unitary countries with weak party systems. What explains the emergence and survival of local hegemonies where parties are weak and federal structures absent? This theory-building paper draws on extensive fieldwork in the Colombian city of Barranquilla, where the Char family has constructed an exceptionally stable local hegemony over the past decade without the aid of a powerful national political party or federal autonomy. Drawing on over eighty interviews with the Char, their local political rivals, civil society actors, and national politicians, I demonstrate that in the context of market reforms, decentralization, and party fragmentation, private firms such as the Char's can successfully engage in subnational state capture through three interrelated mechanisms, all of which relate to contracting for public works: the selection and implementation of infrastructure projects, corrupt exchanges in which surplus funds from public works are traded for campaign finance, and cooptation of local press. This form of subnational state capture may be subtler than the cases of outright "subnational authoritarianism" often discussed in the literature, but it is no less troubling. I provide evidence that subnational state capture by private firms limits transparency and constrains critical political speech, yet also results in the delivery of much needed public goods, making it particularly difficult for effective political opposition to take root. The final section of the paper probes the theory's scope conditions by exploring the shadow case of subnational state capture in Trujillo, Peru. Both cases yield evidence that subnational firms can expand their political networks and ultimately wield national political influence in ways threatening to pluralistic democracy.

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