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My primary interest in this paper is to provide historical and theoretical perspectives toward recent violent political protests as with the apparent likelihood that such protests will recur in the future. I am especially interested in relationships between violent and non-violent political protests, responses to each, their status within the constitutional order, and their effects on constitutional norms.
Part of the motivation for this paper and the context within which I seek to address these topics is the storming and occupation of the U.S. Capitol Building on January 6, 2021. That was a dramatic and highly visible instance of violent political protest. It is not a simple matter coming to grips with the constitutional dimensions and implications of that protest. My interests, moreover, extend beyond examining that particular incident. It punctuated what seems to be an emerging pattern of increasingly violent political protest within the United States.
I currently expect that the proposed paper will have three main sections. The first will provide a brief historical overview of violent political protests in the United States, their relationships to peaceful political protests, and reactions to each. Among other things, I will trace whether those engaged in violent political protests have claimed to be promoting and/or opposing norms of American constitutionalism. I will also examine whether and how, in at least some instances, those advocating or engaging in political violence have joined peaceful political protests and essentially hijacked them for their own purposes. In addition, I will seek in this section to account for whether (and how) responses to political violence or alleged risks or threats of political violence have led to the suppression of peaceful political protests and other constitutionally protected activities. That includes suppression by governmental and non-governmental actors of speech, assembly, and other political activities.
The second section of the proposed paper will examine the extent to which particular violent political protests have been within and/or outside the bounds of the existing constitutional order in one or more respects. I plan to use the U.S. Constitution as the primary reference point for this purpose; and I may also draw secondarily on norms of state constitutionalism. For example, there is apparently a widespread conviction among scholars, government officials, and the people at large that the U.S. Constitution protects peaceful political protest but not violent protest. From such a perspective, peaceful political protest is within the bounds of the existing constitutional order, even if the positions taken by the protestors involve repudiation of existing constitutional norms and governmental practices giving effect to them. Conversely, violent political protest is conventionally viewed as outside the bounds of the existing constitutional order, even if the protestors profess fidelity to norms of U.S. constitutionalism. Complicating analysis of these issues, it is no simple matter seeking to account for protests that involve a mix of peaceful and non-peaceful actors and aims along with expressions both of fidelity to (some) existing constitutional norms and repudiation of some such norms. Taking into account these sorts of variables, I hope to offer a more nuanced, multi-dimensional approach to issues of constitutional inclusion and exclusion with respect to violent political protests.
The third section will explore the constitutional significance of violent protest activities. I expect to focus on two types of effects in particular. First, violent protest activities, along with responses to them, may have suppressed (and may in the future suppress) potentialities for constitutionally significant peaceful protest activities. This indirect effect is troublesome, especially insofar as peaceful political protest has had a privileged status within the American constitutional order. Second, I seek to account for the direct normative effects on the U.S. Constitution of at least some violent political protests. In this connection, I will be drawing on work by myself and others on civil disobedience, civic constitutionalism, and problems of constitutional authority. The central idea here is that certain types of political activities by ordinary people (not only government officials) directly transform constitutional norms. I hope to extend that perspective to account for the direct constitutional significance of violent protest activities, even if they are outside the bounds of the existing constitutional order in one or more respects, and even if they involve repudiation of the U.S. Constitution and the principles of constitutionalism upon which the Constitution rests. I expect to suggest that we must seek to account for these activities if we want to understand important dimensions of constitutional maintenance and change.