Search
Browse By Day
Browse By Time
Browse By Person
Browse By Mini-Conference
Browse By Division
Browse By Session or Event Type
Browse Sessions by Fields of Interest
Browse Papers by Fields of Interest
Search Tips
Virtual Exhibit Hall
Change Preferences / Time Zone
Sign In
X (Twitter)
This paper seeks to explain ethnic and religious violence in post-conflict Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka is a multi-ethnic state where ethnicity, religion, and language are intertwined. There are three ethnic groups in Sri Lanka: Sinhalese, who are predominantly Buddhist and speak Sinhalese, Tamils who are predominantly Hindu and speak Tamil, and ethnic Muslims, who are predominantly followers of Islam and also speak Tamil. Sri Lanka experienced a three-decade-long ethnic conflict that ended in 2009. However, the post-war era is also marked by ethnic tension and sporadic acts of violence against ethnic minorities. In contradiction to these observations, public opinion data suggests that members of all ethnic groups in Sri Lanka support unity and equal rights. In this paper, I seek to explain why ethnic tensions continue in Sri Lanka although most Sri Lankans support unity and equality. I question whether the responses to questions about peace and ethnic unity might result from the responders providing socially acceptable answers. Therefore, it is important to differentiate the citizens’ expressed support for unity from their attitudes towards policies and practices that are conducive to achieving unity. To that end, using public opinion data from the Center for Policy Alternative in Sri Lanka (CPA) and I look beyond broadly phrased questions and analyze questions about specific policies and political behaviors that serve as indicators of the citizens’ level of tolerance towards other ethnic, religious, and linguistic groups in Sri Lanka.
I demonstrate that the Sinhalese majority are less tolerant towards minorities in Sri Lanka, while the members of ethnic minorities display high levels of tolerance towards the ethnic majority and towards all other minority groups. At the societal level, relative to other ethnic groups, the Sinhalese exhibit a high level of intolerance towards other groups. For example, Sinhalese are less likely to support multi-ethnic schools, to live in multi-ethnic neighborhoods, and to work for or take instructions from a member of a different ethnic group. The citizens’ attitudes towards ethnicity, religion, and language in the political sphere differ in an important way. Here, the Sinhalese continue to express an intolerant attitude towards minorities. However, the ethnic minorities also display some intolerance towards the Sinhalese. To highlight one example, relative to Tamil and Muslim citizens, more Sinhalese said that Hindu (predominantly ethnic Tamil) and Muslim politicians express their faith ‘too much.’ On the other hand, relative to the Sinhalese, more Tamil and Muslim citizens said that Buddhist (predominantly Sinhalese) politicians express their religious views ‘too much.’ However, a majority of Sinhalese said that the expression of faith by Buddhist politicians is the ‘right amount.’
I draw two conclusions in this study. First, based on their level of tolerance, Sri Lankans fall into two groups. Contrary to my expectations, this divide does not fall neatly along ethnic lines. Instead, the divide between tolerance levels is marked by whether a group is an ethnoreligious majority or minority. There is very little difference in the level of tolerance between different ethnoreligious minority groups. However, there is a significant difference between the Sinhalese majority and all ethnic minority groups. Second, in post-war Sri Lanka, it is important to differentiate the citizens’ support for unity and reconciliation from their attitudes towards policies and practices that are conducive to achieving unity and reconciliation. Thus far, attitudes regarding religion and language continue to create a wedge between the ethnic majority and the ethnic minorities and can hinder the development of a united and tolerant state.