The Power to Purge: Violent Origins and Authoritarian Power Consolidation

• In Event: Elites & Succession Under Democracy & Autocracy

Abstract

Dictators face an exclusion dilemma. Excluding elites from power is tempting, as it allows dictators to monopolize rents and office. However, exclusion is also risky. Recent scholarship has shown that efforts at exclusion raise the likelihood that elites will launch retaliatory violence against the dictator in the form of coups and civil wars. This is especially true of military elites, whose autonomy and skill in organizing violence makes them particularly capable of overthrowing dictators. I argue that dictators whose regimes originate in violent rebellion are able to overcome this dilemma, and purge their militaries comparatively costlessly. Regimes originating in violent struggle often politicize their armed forces and penetrate them early on with intelligence structures. This reduces the autonomy of the military from the start, and allows for the early detection of potential challengers. Using data on purges between 1965-2005, I establish that dictators in such regimes can and do purge extensively, while minimizing retaliatory violence.

Author

• Sean Paul Ashley, Harvard University