Targeting Livelihoods in Civil Conflict

• In Event: Domestic Origins of Conflict

Abstract

I develop a model of capital destruction in civil conflict, in which a government and an insurgent group fight for power and seek to maximize the future gains from holding office. Combatants trade off short-term military gains against a reduction in the productive capacity of the territory they seek to govern. Destroying infrastructure and capital under control of the opponent increases the probability of victory, but reduces post-conflict economic output, and therefore spoils for the victor. I show that destruction of capital by insurgents is non-monotone. Insurgent groups of moderate capacity target capital most aggressively to gain a tactical advantage, while weak group are incapable of significant capital destruction and strong groups prefer to protect infrastructure in expectation of future economic returns. Governments’ capital targeting, in contrast, is monotonically decreasing in its capacity as stronger regimes expect to remain in power and suffer more from large-scale capital destruction. I then extend the model by introducing strategic citizens, who chose to support either the government or the insurgents and receive wages in return. Counterintuitively, this increases capital targeting by the government and high-capacity insurgents. In this case, destroying capital both generates short-term military gains and reduces citizens’ support for the opponent by reducing wages.

Author

• Jessica Sun, Emory University