From Information Uncertainty To Peaceful Power Rise (Pre-Recorded)

• In Event: Causes of War (Pre-Recorded)

Abstract

It is hard to identify many wars caused by commitment problems, but easy to observe many peaceful large power shifts. Existing theories predict that any potential large power rise will either be forestalled by preventive attacks or be weakened by sanctions or containments. I focus on a type of information uncertainty that is overlooked by existing theories to explain those large but peaceful power shifts in international politics—uncertainty about whether the opponent will have a power rise. Modeling this kind of information uncertainty is important because of its empirical prevalence in real politics, as well as its theoretical function in capturing a fundamental uncertainty in commitment problems. I find that the uncertainty about whether there is a power rise of the opponent could reduce the probability of war when states engage in bargaining, constrasting the aggravating effect of the uncertainty about moves on the probability of war. My finding provides a straightforward explanation for why many rising actors successfully achieved their power rise without triggering preventive measure from the declining state, and sheds light on the mechanism of instrumental bargaining, a prevalent phenomenon that is less investigated in international relations. I use the political talks between the Chinese Nationalist Party (CNP) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) between 1945 and 1946 to illustrate how the tremendous power rise of the Communist during a brief peace accords with the logics of my model.

Author

• Haonan Dong, Vanderbilt University