The Hidden Electoral Incentive: How Voters Reward Climate Change Positions

• In Event: Experimental Studies of U.S. Voters

Abstract

Do voters reward candidates based on their position on climate change policies? Prior work has looked at this question but very little experimental work has been done to determine whether voters’ expressed preferences on climate change actually translate into political behavior. This is an important gap in the literature as climate change and the environment have long been highly valued but low salience issue areas—suggesting the potential that voters merely claim to care about candidates’ climate positions but are unwilling to back it up with their vote choice.

Perhaps more interesting is the question of whether and how partisanship moderates this effect. Do voters only reward Democrats for supporting climate change, or do Republicans stand to gain? If voters reward both, is there a strategic interaction where the utility of a candidate taking a position is conditional on the position of the opposing candidate?

This study seeks to provide answers to these questions and understand the dynamics of how voters use climate change to inform their vote choice. I use a candidate-choice survey experiment imbedded in a module of the 2020 CCES (n=1,000). Respondents are provided with a pair of candidates and asked to choose which candidate they prefer in each a simulated primary and general election match-up. Each profile of a candidate provides one of three positions (liberal, moderate, or conservative) on three baseline policies (healthcare, gun control, and abortion) plus one of two positions on climate change. The experimental component operates through the climate position of each candidate, where the candidate either supports or does not support the EPA regulating carbon dioxide emissions.

In the general election, an operationally liberal Democrat (D) is pitted against an operationally moderate Republican (R). Both candidates are randomly assigned a position either supporting or not supporting the climate change action. Similar to the general election, in the primary an ideological candidate (A) competes against a moderate candidate (B), but is of the same party. It differs in that Candidates A and B can jointly take only one of the two following stances: {A support climate and B not-support climate; A not-support climate and B support climate}.

This experimental design permits me to evaluate the causal effect of taking a green position on climate change for candidates from both parties, as well as to understand the strategic incentives facing candidates based on known positions of the opposing candidate. Lastly, I look at whether this effect extends to a primary election—an important test given the threat that primary entrants can attempt to use climate change as a wedge issue.

Author

• Kenneth Mackie