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Though the relationship between globalization and civil war has been extensively studied, the implications of how we define globalization in this relationship have been overlooked. Globalization is assumed to be an external force that influences the behavior of actors before civil war onset. While this is true, the impact of globalization also comes from the degree of receptiveness by states, which is influenced by external factors as well as internal factors. When a state is less receptive to the forces of globalization, its impact is bound to be limited. The definition of globalization that we use to inform our study determines the direction of the causal relationship between globalization and civil war. If we look at states’ receptiveness as a proxy for globalization, then it becomes an independent variable instead of a dependent variable. To differentiate the forces of globalization from governments’ receptiveness, I use de facto and de jure globalization concepts respectively, as measured by the KOF Globalization dataset. This paper claims that the security concerns of a state take precedence over its economic concerns. Even if a lower level of openness to the forces of globalization may mean losing out on economic benefits, states accept this cost if there is a risk that this openness weakens the hands of their government in its handling of the civil war. During a civil war, states may come under pressure from international actors as well as domestic actors, such as civil society groups, that can restrict their actions for humanitarian reasons. On the other hand, non-state armed groups lack a transparent organizational structure and accountability mechanisms. This difference makes it difficult to put pressure on non-state armed groups. Both sides of the conflict are aware of this dynamic. States know that pressure from third-party actors may limit their strategies and may force them to make more concessions at the bargaining table. While non-state armed groups try to exploit this advantage, states experiencing a security threat from the conflict employ policies to lower their receptiveness to globalization at the risk of incurring economic costs by reducing the influence of international norms, international actors, markets, and civil society. A preliminary quantitative analysis lends support to this theory. Additionally, the strategies employed by the Turkish government, following the end of the Peace Process with PKK in 2015, suggest that civil war urges governments to minimize internal or external influences such as pressure from markets, societal groups, and international actors. The result is reduced receptiveness with lower levels of de jure globalization.