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This paper argues that China’s determination to connect to the West has given the Kazakh government more leverage in demanding support for non-connectivity projects, including the investment and cooperation in car assembly, hydro power and food processing industries. China’s presence has also fostered a mixed Sinophobic resistance and Sinophilic drive to shape the nuanced evolvement of the newly incorporated Sino-Kazakh joint projects. Tracing Kazakhstan’s effort to diversify its economy from the resource industry in the past 30 years, this paper illuminates that China’s introduction of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013 has unintentionally tipped the asymmetric Sino-Kazakh power structure and given Kazakhstan more leverage to negotiate for a desirable way to engage with China. The materialization of the elites’ plan, however, varies in terms of the planner’s vision and capacity, the contested sub-national interests, as well as the co-evolvement of the two emerging forces. The case studies of the three newly developed sectors in Kazakhstan contribute to a comprehensive yet nuanced explanation of the intended and un-intended outcome for a typical post-communist government to engage with China’s state capital.