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Respect is widely taken to be a fundamental end and good of human life. (see e.g. Kant 1785, Rawls 1971, and beyond). While we may not be due esteem or admiration, dignity and recognition respect are essential to human flourishing. (Darwall 1977) Without those forms of respect we are diminished as people, in our experience of the world, and in our ability to realize our individual and collective aims. This paper begins with the supposition that that argument is fundamentally correct—but that meaningful respect has been conflated with the performance of respectability in ways that cover for and perpetuate structural injustice, and ultimately constitute a profound and asymmetrical disrespect that disproportionately affects marginalized groups and group members.
Indeed, this asymmetry, stemming from the metonymic use of respectability as a stand in for respect, contributes seriously to limitations on human flourishing within pluralistic societies. As a set of norms and behavioral edicts, respectability encompasses legal and social imperatives to be orderly, chaste, modest, decorous, virtuous, and in control of emotional and bodily urges. In the 19th century, 20th century and contemporary United States, these norms have been presented as neutral and universal. In practice, however, they come from and are tied to white, straight, middle-class, patriarchal, Protestant norms of family, work, and civic life. (Mosse 1985, Young 1990, Higginbotham 1993) I argue that they therefore reflect and function as part of larger power structures that privilege whiteness, masculinity, heterosexuality, Protestantism, able-bodiedness, and wealth, and put members of advantaged groups in a position to determine what constitutes respect-worthy behavior. While it would be illegal or socially taboo for those in power to deprive marginalized people of respect on account of their belonging to marginalized groups, respectability allows overtly bigoted language and logic to be replaced with language that evokes respect. It is not (the logic goes) that certain groups aren’t deserving because of their race, nationality, sexuality, and so on; it is because they are disrespectable (so, performing the norms associated with groups that are not white, not heterosexual, immigrants, etc.) and therefore worthy of disrespect. The performance of respectability becomes an implicit precondition of respect.
This dynamic creates what I call respect asymmetries, in which marginalized people must work to earn respect from those in the center, whereas those in the center take for granted that they are due respect from each other and from those at the margins, and that they are able to set the terms on which respect must be earned. This asymmetry is itself a form of disrespect; it assumes that some ways of life are more valuable than others, and devalues and disregards those other ways of life out of hand. It also disadvantages and provides justifications for the oppression of those who will not reject and hide their affiliation with those devalued communities and ways of life, thereby producing other forms of asymmetry: in economic opportunity, public credibility, political participation, public safety, and support from public institutions.
In response to these asymmetries, I argue that if we are to take respect seriously as essential to human flourishing, it cannot be contingent upon deference to and compliance with the expectation of a specific performance. This is perhaps especially true when that performance asks those who are already disadvantaged by their social positions to “cover” aspects of their identity in order to curry favor with those who are most advantaged. (Yoshino 2006) The effect of requiring this performance is to stifle expressions of pluralism, put a disproportionate burden on marginalized people to bridge those asymmetries, undermine dissenting voices, and reify systems that profoundly disadvantage the safety, well-being, and flourishing of marginalized people within pluralist societies. Rather than predicating respect on the performance of respectability, I argue that a robust and symmetrical understanding of respect requires that members of a society default to granting the presumption of recognition respect on the basic fact of humanity–not requiring that it be earned through acquiescence to patriarchy, ableism, homophobia, and white supremacy. Decoupling respect from the performance of respectability thereby expands the possible forms of expression and difference that can be equitably and justly accommodated within a pluralistic society.