Unbinding the Executive: Support for Unchecked Presidents in Latin America

• In Event: Citizens' Perspectives on Democracy

Abstract

Under what conditions do voters favor unchecked presidents? Conventional wisdom suggests that voters should favor constitutional checks and balances that increase their control over elected officials (c.f. Barro 1973; Ferejohn 1986). Yet, in some cases, majorities vote to dismantle checks on the executive and broaden presidential powers (Acemoglu et al 2013). Notable cases include the expansion of presidential powers through constitutional referendums in Venezuela (1999), Ecuador (2007), and Turkey (2017). Building on findings that electoral winners favor unconstrained executives (Singer 2018), I examine the political conditions that lead voters to endorse executives governing without legislative or judicial oversight. I argue that electoral winners favor unchecked presidents when 1) executives are weak relative to the legislature and 2) when the court or legislature threatens redistributive policies supported by the president. In other words, gridlock and elite opposition to popular policies diminish public support for constitutional checks on the executive. I test this argument by analyzing survey data covering 50,000+ individuals in 18 Latin American countries between 2010 and 2012. Using Bayesian multilevel models, I find evidence that electoral winners are more supportive of removing checks on the executive when the president endorses redistributive policies and faces strong legislative opposition. These findings have important implications for democratic backsliding in presidential regimes: Presidential supporters are likely to forgive—and even support—efforts to expand executive power when presidents face institutional gridlock and elite opposition to popular policies.

Author

• Brett Bessen, University of Colorado Boulder