Search
Browse By Day
Browse By Time
Browse By Person
Browse By Mini-Conference
Browse By Division
Browse By Session or Event Type
Browse Sessions by Fields of Interest
Browse Papers by Fields of Interest
Search Tips
Virtual Exhibit Hall
Change Preferences / Time Zone
Sign In
X (Twitter)
This study examines the regime legitimization strategies of competitive authoritarian regimes in three countries, namely, Bangladesh, Hungary, and Turkey. The selected cases represent three different geographic regions and share dissimilar historical, cultural, ideological, and demographical characteristics. The Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem)’s democracy report 2020 has affirmed that these countries have moved from liberal and electoral democracy to electoral autocracy. Using Levitsky & Way’s definition of competitive authoritarian regimes ‘as those in which democratic institutions are used to exercise political authority, but incumbents violate the rules often enough that the regimes fail to meet conventional minimum standards for democracy’, this study explores how these regimes legitimize their rule. Available literature offers three key institutional strategies of authoritarian regimes for regime legitimization: election, co-optation & oppression, and economic performance, but largely overlooked non-institutional or ideological aspects as a regime legitimization strategy.
In this backdrop, this study offers the central argument that non-institutional or ideological legitimization works in combination with institutional legitimization to construct legitimacy in competitive authoritarian regimes. Using an inductive theory-building strategy, it develops a broader theoretical framework on regime legitimization that includes three key strategies: procedural, performance, and ideological. It finds that a nationalist ideology in Bangladesh, a right-wing populist ideology in Hungary, and an Islamist and populist ideology in Turkey have worked side by side with procedural and performance strategies in these countries to construct regime legitimacy. In all three cases, the procedural strategies include politicizing election, controlling political opposition, media manipulation, and changing the rules of the game. Similarly, the performance legitimization strategies in all three cases comprise regime performance, economic growth, social services, and reference to regime performance.
The paper’s contribution is two-fold. First, the three-fold regime legitimization framework is transferable and applicable to any competitive authoritarian contexts, helping us to identify trends in the regime legitimization processes. Second, regime legitimacy is earned well once the procedural, the performance, and the ideological strategies are used concurrently.