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Throughout his works, Jean-Jacques Rousseau affirms that speech is man’s first social institution, created so that he might communicate his passions to others. As the Genevan moves from the social to the political, however, he presents language (or at least human language) as a tool inadequate to create and preserve the laws that sustain a people.
This presents a formidable threat to the life of the republic: that is, the regime ruled by law. Moreover, this tension between the discursive foundations of social life and the non-discursive practices that sustain the body politic appears at the very moment that popular sovereignty is imagined. The people must have the character, habits, and practices appropriate for them to exercise sovereign power, such that they may retain their liberty. The laws play a key role in shaping them. Yet what human faculties might aid would-be citizens in taking on this yolk?
Rousseau’s legislator famously must credit the gods with his own wisdom and use their authority “to compel without violence and persuade without convincing.” Here, force, eloquent speech, and reason appear in tandem. To convince is to conquer with reason and thus bring another into agreement. To persuade is to move the passions and direct human forces. Force is dismissed outright (and elsewhere) as an illegitimate foundation for law. The laws are first realized through their discursive effects, not their underlying wisdom. Due to Rousseau’s understanding of the decoupling of speech and reason, the true reason that serves as basis for a harmonious political community that follows the dictates of justice must be approached obliquely through the passions. In Rousseau’s republic, the sovereign’s own acts of legislation can be read as an attempt to imitate the legislator’s foundational act. The people form the general will, however, not through an act of public speech but through silent deliberation. The well-ordered republic which brings human interests into line with the demands of universal justice requires citizens, in a sense, to remain as the legislator made them. Voiceless reason moves all to consider the general interest.
A more troubling picture emerges where Rousseau elaborates on the relationship between language and governments. An active and discursive people who use the speech of political opinion and debate are lost to the ancient polity. In his own time, the people are “scattered,” fit neither for forming the general will nor even for deliberative rhetoric, with all its faults. Furthermore, Rousseau associates lack of political discourse with arbitrary power, where persuasion is replaced by public force: “Neither art nor figures of speech are needed to say, such is my pleasure” (Essay on the Origin of Languages XX). Reason is absent from the immediate discussion, and is denigrated elsewhere in this work.
Rousseau’s solution to the problem of human liberty by putting the public force in different hands is complicated due to the role that speech and language play in human affairs. The Rousseauian republic attempts to circumvent austere demands on persons’ capacities for speech and reason and even a public space in which to exercise these. Yet absent a reliance on rational speech, only shared passions and love of the laws can preserve a free people. In this, Rousseau’s discursive difficulties in combining popular sovereignty with republican rule may offer resources for understanding the decline of civil discourse and the concomitant rise of violence and force. It offers a further reminder that the consequence of the failure of the bonds created by the laws is despotism and the loss of liberty.