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Strategic Restraint in Economic Intelligence Policy Under Trump

Sun, October 3, 6:00 to 7:30am PDT (6:00 to 7:30am PDT), TBA

Abstract

The policy prohibiting the US Intelligence Community from transmitting intelligence products to American firms for their commercial advantage was a key element of strategic restraint in the construction of US hegemony after the Cold War, acting as a discursive tool to portray indiscriminate intelligence collection as benign while the US held unprecedented structural power in global telecommunication networks. The policy was enacted in the early 1990s when the perceived challenge to American economic competitiveness emanated from state-backed firms in allied democracies like France and Japan. Today, China has become both America’s prime economic and geopolitical rival. Informational and financial networks are increasingly being weaponized to exploit structural advantages in service of national interest. The Trump Administration cast aside norms which previously restrained trade policy and employed securitization rhetoric around economic warfare with China, suggesting a willingness to use national security institutions to support economic competitiveness. This paper examines how beliefs about the proper role of intelligence agencies in supporting American firms have developed over the course of the Trump presidency both within intelligence agencies and in the broader policy community. The paper then examines the barriers to reform in intelligence missions given the capacity of bureaucracies to resist executive direction and the extraordinarily strained relations between President Trump and intelligence officials, drawing parallels to the failed attempt by the Carter Administration to redirect the CIA toward an industrial espionage mission in the 1970s. Examining how normative beliefs about the proper role of US intelligence agencies have changed during the Trump Administration offers insight into whether the self-imposed prohibition on directly supporting US firms with intelligence products will persist in the current era of volatility in world order.

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