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There is a dearth of scholarship that grounds cultural and psychological elements into normative tests of the impacts of disinformation on foreign policy. The domestic upheaval in the US Capitol in early January serves to accentuate the real dangers of leadership-sanctioned disinformation. Much of the extant literature is split on how to best evaluate the influence of state-sanctioned (to the best of our knowledge) disinformation campaigns on foreign policy. Much of the ambiguity stems from lacking analysis of disparate national circumstances that have shaped the polity and economy that serves as the bedrock of societal functions. The accelerating pace of misinformation, disinformation, and state-sanctioned campaigns of either, underscore the need for renewed study. This research posits that disinformation serves one primary purpose and a second auxiliary function: foremost, to influence domestic public opinions to abet in the legitimatizing of governance. Secondly, to alter perceptions from other states such that it shapes foreign policies directly affecting or surrounding the initiating state. These functions do not occur uniformly, but are influenced by the cultural circumstances that shape the nationalist ethos of disparate states—or nationalist dispositions. Their given histories and final cultural zeitgeist are major attributes that impact the relative success and failure of disinformation campaigns, and are deeply considered in state-sanctioned attempts. In addition to evaluating literature concerning the interaction between frontier technology, disinformation, and political psychology, this research raises three case studies of state-sanctioned disinformation campaigns to appraise how nationalist dispositions are uniquely key in predicting the outcomes of such programs. First, the Trump administration’s election-fraud campaign, China’s COVID-19 origin obfuscation, and third, the North and South Korean spat over manipulated public opinion. Discussion of nationalist dispositions would provide much needed ammunition to further delve into the deleterious effects of disinformation, and serve to strengthen further inquiry into its effects as a whole, as well as its impact on political behavior.